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It Wasn’t Us: Reply to Michael Brent
Rick Repetti 1

Abstract

In “Confessions of a Deluded Westerner,” Michael Brent insists no contributions to Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will
(Repetti) even address free will because none deploy the criteria for free will that Western (incompatibilist) philosophers identify: the ability to do otherwise under identical
conditions, and the ability to have one’s choices be up to
oneself. Brent claims the criteria and abilities in that anthology are criteria for intentional action, but not all intentional actions are free. He also insists that Buddhism, ironically, cannot even accept intentional action, because, on
his analysis, intentionality requires an agent, which Buddhism rejects. I have four responses: (i) Brent ignores the
other half of the debate, compatibilism, in both Western and
Buddhist philosophy, represented in the anthology by several contributors; (ii) the autonomy of Buddhist meditation
virtuosos is titanic compared to Brent’s autonomy criteria,
which latter are relatively mundane and facile, rather than
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something Buddhists fail to rise up to; (iii) such titanic Buddhist autonomy challenges, and possibly defeats, all major
Western arguments against free will; and (iv) several contributors address the possibility of agentless agency. These
responses could have been taken right out of the anthology, not only from my contributions.

Introduction

Coming from a Western analytic philosophical perspective, and bringing
a degree of conceptual precision thereby, Michael Brent makes certain interesting claims about, and analyses of, certain conceptions of free will,
for which he is to be commended. However, I see no need to remark specifically upon what we agree about, but only to remark about those claims
to which I take objection. Brent raises the level of the discussion by bringing a degree of clarity and precision to certain criteria for free will, but
not enough, as I hope to show. He also seems unaware that the replies to
his critique, which should go without saying, are already quite visible in
the anthology that he critiques, so I doubt anything I will say here was not
already stated there.

Brent’s Objections and My Replies

Brent’s main objection against most of the contributions to the anthology
is that none of them rise up to the level of addressing free will, which he
simply assumes is the sort of free will that incompatibilists have in mind,
namely, that which satisfies two criteria: (i) in choosing or doing X, the
agent could have chosen or done otherwise under identical conditions
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(which is typically taken to be impossible in a deterministic world),2 and
(ii) in choosing or doing X, it was entirely up to the agent, such that nothing else caused the agent to do X. These are, respectively, leeway and source
autonomy: the agent had leeway to make alternative choices, other than
the one she made, and nothing caused her to do so, in which case she is
the source of her choice. Brent faults most of the contributors to Buddhist
Perspectives on Free Will (Repetti), basically, for failing to address these criteria. Instead, he insists, all the criteria they adduce, and all the abilities
they appeal to, in what they take to be discussions of free will, are not
about free will at all. At most, he claims, they are about intentional action,
but intentional actions may or may not be free.
Brent thinks the intentional actions that Buddhists mistakenly appeal to, then, miss the mark: they are not obviously free actions. It is as if,
by analogy, Buddhist philosophers were presenting a theory of human beings, but only set forth criteria that do not differentiate human beings
from other primates. To keep with this analogy, Brent’s response seems
to presuppose that there are only male human beings, whereas the better
part of the anthology that he critiques is devoted to describing female human beings.
Brent is to be commended for noticing that several of the contributors to Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will (Repetti) do not explicitly address
the two leading Western (incompatibilist) conceptions of free will, the
ability to do otherwise under identical conditions and the ability to have it
that one’s choices are up to one, which conceptions are held by both those
who think these criteria are satisfied (libertarians) and those who think
Cf. Repetti (Buddhism), where I argue that there is a causal/counterfactual sense, consistent with determinism, in which agents could have done otherwise under identical
conditions, based on an analysis of “could” that does not beg the question; see Repetti
(Counterfactual) for a more elaborate counterfactual analysis of autonomy as consistent
with determinism.
2
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they are not (hard determinists). Both are incompatibilists: they agree
that these abilities are incompatible with determinism, but the former insists free will obtains and thus determinism is false, and the latter insists
that determinism is true, and thus there is no free will.
Brent is also to be commended for taking a strong position about
what free will requires. This position is important, for many Buddhist
scholars entering this discussion are relatively unfamiliar with the incredibly rich taxonomy and dialectical distribution of positions that have
evolved in the Western philosophical literature on the subject in the past
century or so. Thus, Brent brings an insistence on a level of analytic precision where it is admittedly often lacking. After all, Buddhist philosophy
is a distinct philosophical modality, with its own taxonomy and dialectical
history. Similarly, Western philosophers entering its fray often need to be
pressed from the other side in ways that are analogous to what Brent is
doing here for Buddhists. He is thus, again, correct to claim that the two
criteria that (roughly, only half of) Western analytic philosophers consider central to free will are the two he presses, namely, leeway autonomy,
the ability to do otherwise under identical conditions, and source autonomy,
the ability to have it be the case that one’s choices and actions are up to
oneself.
However, roughly only half of the positions in logical space—that
is, within the matrix of logical possibilities—for the free will problem are
positions defined by those two criteria. That is, those two criteria define
the views of incompatibilists, those who think free will and determinism
are incompatible. The other half of the matrix of positions is occupied by
compatibilists, those who think free will and determinism are compatible.
Almost all compatibilists reject the idea that leeway autonomy or source
autonomy are necessary for free will, whether they are Western or Buddhist philosophers. Brent seems not to address the fact that most of the
contributors to the anthology are compatibilists, but instead his account
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gives the impression that they are simply confused about the criteria they
deploy, as if they are trying to talk about free will, but are too conceptually
confused to successfully participate intelligently in the discussion (as if
the only intelligent discussion here is the incompatibilist one). This interpretive posture borders on the straw man fallacy. On behalf of the majority of compatibilist contributors to the anthology, I can safely reply, it
wasn’t us!
Insofar as Brent represents the Western critique of Buddhist views
of free will, he also misrepresents half of the Western view of free will: for
the other (compatibilist) half of positions in the Western philosophical
matrix of positions on free will is roughly homologous with the (compatibilist) positions in the Buddhist philosophical matrix. Brent gives the misleading impression that (analytically precise) Western philosophers
would reject (analytically imprecise) Buddhist views of free will, but that
is significantly misleading. For half of the same matrix of logical possibilities (incompatibilist and compatibilist) obtains in both Western and Buddhist logical space, so to speak. Logic is logic, and the question of incompatibilism versus compatibilism is a purely logical question: Is free will
logically compatible with determinism? Thus, whereas Brent does raise
the level of precision in the debate, by insisting that Buddhists explicitly
address the criteria for leeway and source autonomy, he does not raise it
sufficiently.
Brent quotes some prefacing remarks that I used in the anthology
to sketch some of the features of our intuitions about the problematic nature of our conception of free will, which I made simply as opening remarks about the complexity of the problem, and he apparently dismisses
them as failing to uniquely define free will in accordance with his own
very specific incompatibilist conception and analysis. Similarly, he does
this sort of thing with almost all the other divergent conceptions of free
will addressed by the several contributing authors in the anthology.
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Again, without really arguing for their validity or necessity, Brent uses
those two incompatibilist conceptions of free will that he takes to be definitive of the Western analytic understanding of the subject, namely, leeway and source autonomy, as the gold standards for evaluating the various elements of autonomous agency under consideration among the divergent voices within the Buddhist philosophical discussion, and implicitly rejects them all on the ground that that they are not identical with his
standard. In a sense, Brent seems to ignore many elements of (compatibilist) nuance to be found in the variety of perspectives he lumps together
as, essentially, failing to be incompatibilist. Again, however, there are
Buddhist compatibilists, so pressing incompatibilist claims is not enough
to shift the burden of proof onto compatibilists. To shift the burden, more
would be needed than simply assuming incompatibilism is correct, from
which assumption anything compatibilist would fail automatically. But
that would beg the question against compatibilism. It is not an obvious
fact that incompatibilism is true.
Brent makes a similar move in interpreting all compatibilist criteria as criteria for intentional action, as opposed to criteria for free will. He
takes various remarks that the contributors make regarding certain feature of agency or will and argues that they are not definitive features of
his two leading conceptions of free will simply because they (also, I would
add) happen to be features of something more general than his narrowlydefined incompatibilist conception of autonomy, namely, intentional action. That is, he rejects certain (compatibilist) conceptions of free will addressed by various contributors on the grounds that they are criteria or
features of intentional action in general, but not constitutive of all and only
those intentional actions that are free. But it is not at all clear that Buddhist philosophers grappling with the question whether there is any room in
Buddhism for free will have accepted the Western philosophical task of identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for incompatibilist free will, nor that
they are taken in by the Western philosophical dialectic or language game
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of first trying to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept before considering whether there are general doctrinal reasons in
Buddhism to be receptive to the idea at all.
To the contrary, Buddhist philosophers are in the very earliest
stages of explicitly trying to come to philosophical grips with the Western
philosophical conception free will—whether compatibilist, incompatibilist, some blend of both, or neither. The anthology is properly entitled to
be precisely about “Buddhist Perspectives” (plural), and the sub-title ends
with a question mark, “Agentless Agency?”—indicating the open-ended,
exploratory nature of that question. Pertinently, there are no agreedupon necessary and sufficient conditions for free will in Western philosophy anyway. To the contrary, compatibilists and incompatibilists radically disagree about what constitutes free will, and, crucially, compatibilists accept as criteria for compatibilist free will precisely all the Buddhist
criteria Brent rejects on the grounds, essentially, that they are not incompatibilist criteria. Within the dialectical conflict between compatibilism
and incompatibilism, however, that is circular reasoning: it begs the question against compatibilism.
Western philosophers who specialize in free will frequently, if not
typically, speak past each other in defining the concept in ways that are
or are not compatible with determinism, or indeterminism, or both, or
neither. On analysis, then, Brent’s insistence upon rejecting divergent
Buddhist conceptions of features of agency that matter within the radically different conceptual framework of Buddhism on the ground that they
are not his particularly preferred Western philosophical criteria, when
the latter do not constitute an accepted consensus, is unwarranted. It also
seems to beg the question against Buddhism, as if to reject Buddhism because it is not identical with Western philosophy.
Brent adds a more serious irony to this line of criticism, after having first tried to establish it. The irony is that, whereas the Buddhists in
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question have allegedly failed to even adduce correct criteria for free will,
namely, Brent’s (incompatibilist) criteria, offering what on his analysis
turn out only to be criteria for intentional action, not all of which is free,
Brent argues that the Buddhist cannot even have that weaker model of
mere intentional action. Pressing his own Western conception of agency,
Brent insists that agents are necessary for intentional actions, but Buddhism rejects the agent or self. Thus, any Buddhists who think there can
be free will must be doubly confused: There can be no free will for Buddhists if the only criteria they offer for free will turn out to be merely criteria for intentional action, and there can be no intentional action without
an agent, but there are no Buddhist agents!
To further develop my above analogy with the theory of human
beings, it is as if the Buddhist not only offered only criteria that do not
distinguish between primates and humans, but it is as if Buddhism also
rejects the existence of mammals, in which case there cannot even be
Buddhist primates because there cannot be primates if there are no mammals. On Brent’s analysis, then, those Buddhists who think there can be
free will must be incredibly confused. What is more confusing is how
Brent seems not to have noticed the many arguments and analyses
throughout the anthology which address the issue of agentless agency, a
theme explicit in the anthology’s subtitle. Again, the responses I am offering to Brent’s criticisms were all in the anthology.
I have noted in prior writings that the very concept of free will is
complex and contested, particularly in my first book on the subject (Counterfactual)—a primarily Western analytic approach, but significantly informed by Buddhist ideas—where I devoted an introductory chapter to
defining several dozen conceptions of, and positions on, autonomy, each
with many concatenations, and many divergent elements of agency. In
that book, I also devoted a chapter to constructing and defending a comprehensive theory of the will, which subsumes all other leading theories of
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the will and of free will. As noted above, Brent makes a point of differentiating between intentional agency and free will, the latter being a subset
of the former, but this differentiation is just an equivalent description of
the difference between the will (volitional intentionality, albeit under a different description) and free will. I have described autonomy (Counterfactual; Buddhist) as a control-theoretic volitional ability spread across the entire spectrum of voluntary behavior, which for enlightened beings, advanced yogis, and other meditation virtuosos includes many things that
are not normally considered voluntary, and as admitting of degrees, with
those virtuosos possessing the highest degree, analogous to Olympic athletes of autonomy, relative to which Brent’s gold standards, mere leeway
and source autonomy, are amateur abilities, e.g., the ability to have ordered the tofu, despite having ordered the seitan, and it being up to me
that I did so.
Other contributors to the collection, e.g., Meyers, Wallace, McRae,
etc., have made similar observations Thus, there seems to be a straightforward sense in which the descriptions of free will offered by the contributors and the descriptions attributed to them and critiqued by Brent
are not the same. Contrary to the impression Brent gives to the effect that
our criteria fail to meet his standard, we have offered criteria of free will
that are stronger than Brent’s criteria, not weaker. Again, the positions he
seems to critique are not the ones we offered in the anthology. Who was
it that offered those positions? It wasn’t us!
Returning to the issue of agentless agency, Brent seems to miss the
subtleties of the overall Buddhist framework as reflected, for example, in
the paradox of control (implicit in the subtitle of the collection, Agentless
Agency?), to the effect that the more control contemplative agents possess,
the less substantive their agency appears to them. Plenty was said in the
anthology to differentiate between various different senses of the self, as
well as different senses in which the self may be thought to be illusory,
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e.g., not necessarily non-existent, but only existing in a way that differs
from the way it appears to exist to the unenlightened. Recall, for example,
Abelson’s careful analysis of Siderits’s “shifting coalitions” model of the
self, Harvey’s model of the “empirical” self, Aronson’s “psychological”
versus “metaphysical” conceptions of the self, and, among others, my own
description of the inverse relationship between an increasing autonomy
and a decreasing self-sense attendant upon progress along the Buddhist
path.
This latter example—that of the inverse relationship between increased agency and a decreased sense of a substantive agent—is admittedly somewhat paradoxical, which is one of the reasons I ended the subtitle of the anthology with interrogatory punctuation (Agentless Agency?),
but the idea is not incoherent. From the vantage of Brent’s paradigm for
incompatibilist free will, the Buddhist paradigm reverses things, for on his
Western view, the stronger the sense of self, the more autonomy. Although the Buddhist paradigm is problematic from Brent’s perspective, according to which latter an agent is required for agency, the same sort of
inverse idea was made by a number of the other contributors to the anthology. It was also made fairly perspicuously in Federman and Ergas (in
this Special Issue), in their analysis of the phases of meditative progress,
according to which there is a cyclical shifting between efforts at control
and efforts at non-control, with the latter paradoxically enhancing the
former. Gold’s analysis (in this Special Issue) also arguably adds a level of
nuance to the paradox of control to be found in the Buddhist understanding of agency. In fairness to Brent, Federman and Ergas did not appear in
the original collection, nor did Gold. However, again, enough was articulated along similar lines throughout the edited collection that Brent is critiquing.
Although it also did not come out until after Brent’s article had
been submitted, my monograph, Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will, goes
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into the paradox of control in great detail, and emphasizes the extent to
which libertarian-type, allegedly “strong” Western philosophical conceptions of free will pale in comparison with the sort of agency exhibited by
Buddhist meditation virtuosos. However, I argued for that claim in detail
in the anthology (Buddhist) and in previous writings (Meditation; Possibility). I also argued in both the anthology (Buddhist) and (in greater detail)
in the monograph (Buddhism) that the abilities Brent thinks are insufficient
for free will, according to his allegedly “strong” criteria, are sufficient to
challenge and possibly defeat all the most powerful Western philosophical
arguments against free will, including the Consequence Argument, the
Manipulation Argument, the Randomness Argument, the Luck Argument,
and the Impossibility Argument.3 How such an effective model of free will
could be weaker than Brent’s criteria for free will escapes me.
Buddhist meditation virtuosos, the mental equivalent of Olympic
athletes, can have the state of mind they want to have and not have the
state of mind they want not to have, and so on for the volitions they want
to have or lack, the emotions they want to have or lack, the attention they
want to have or lack, etc., which is something I also emphasized in the
edited collection which Brent thinks makes no mention of criteria sufficient for autonomy. These titans of autonomy possess the maximal sort of
autonomy that is biologically possible, so to speak, for human beings,
namely, mental freedom, freedom of the mind, or mental autonomy.
Whereas Harry Frankfurt differentiated between freedom of action as being
able to act on one’s desires (what Brent treats as intentional action) and
freedom of the will as being able to have the sort of will one wants to have
The gist of that set of arguments is that the mental freedom possessed by the advanced
meditation practitioner is secured regardless of whether the conditions feeding into the
practitioner’s mental states are, respectively, deterministic, manipulated, indeterministic, a matter of luck, or influenced by conditioning. A concise version of these arguments
is presented in the anthology (Buddhist), but they are spelled out in increasingly greater
detail in Repetti (Meditation; Possibility; and Buddhism), in that order.

3
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(that is, one is able to act only on the desires one wants to act on and to
not act on the desires one wants to act on), the Buddhist’s freedom of the
mind is being able to have the sort of mental state one wants to have, and
to not have the sort of mental state one wants not to have. This broader
category of mental autonomy includes not only freedom of action and freedom of the will, but freedom of attention, freedom of emotion, and freedom of perception, among other freedoms ranging over anything voluntary and even potentially voluntary. (Recall, advanced yogis can control
functions not normally accessible to will in the autonomic nervous system.) These claims are fully developed and defended in my recently published monograph (Buddhism).
As many contributors to the anthology (Buddhist) make these
claims, and in light of my claims in this article, it is unclear how Brent
could maintain that the contributions in the anthology fail to rise to the
level of his allegedly strong criteria for free will. The opposite seems more
obvious.
Recall that Brent claimed that there cannot even be intentional action without a self. I disagree, but not only on Buddhist grounds. On Frankfurt’s analysis, mentioned above, intentional action is analyzed as freedom of action, being able to act on one’s desires, or to perform actions
that one wants or intends to perform. For Frankfurt, importantly, intentional action is insufficient for free will because young children, animals,
and mentally ill adults—all of whom are beings we do not normally hold
morally responsible—are able to act on their intentions: the horse, toddler, or elderly person suffering severe dementia is able to run to the left
upon the desire or intention to do so. It is highly doubtful that any of them
have a sense of self, much less an actual self, but acting on volitional impulse does not require a self. For Frankfurt, freedom of the will, rather,
requires being able to have the sort of intentions or will that one wants to
have. Some have objected to Frankfurt that higher-order desires (wanting
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these intentions to be effective, as opposed to those intentions) can arise
deterministically. Thus, they can also arise in the absence of a self. Arguably, the rat, seeing food to its left and a cat to its right, might be able to
form a higher-order intention not to act on its first-order desire for the
food. Whether rats have selves, however, is questionable enough to
ground the idea that it is not incoherent or contradictory to think
agentless actions are possible.
Importantly, and ironically, the Buddhist, in seeing through the
constructed nature of the self, is able to have the sort of self he wants to
have: he has freedom of the self. Although the general goal of Buddhism may
be described as freedom from the self, this latter freedom can be interpreted
coherently as freedom from the faulty interpretation of the self that gives
the illusory, suffering-causing impression that the self is an unchanging,
immaterial, executive homunculus riding above and apart from the psychophysiological collection of our parts, which does not necessarily entail
the obliteration of subjectivity, experiential or phenomenological perspectivalism, the ability to act on appropriate volitions (like compassion),
the ability to appropriate one’s parts and experiences in narrative
memory, and/or a host of other abilities and elements that may be able to
play a causal/functional role in the embodied mental life of an enlightened or spiritually advanced being, a being who obviously can speak, walk,
eat, and perform intentional actions in a highly disciplined and orderly, if
not elegant, manner. This claim arguably applies not only to the Buddha,
but also to those titanic bodhisattvas who intend to continue being reborn
until all sentient beings attain nirvana.
In order to attain freedom from the self, one might add, one must
first cultivate freedom of the self, the ability to deconstruct the self, detach from its entrenched volitional and related dispositions, and reconstruct a more enlightened, liberated, malleable, but functional self in accordance with one’s higher-order (Buddhist) values. I see no reason why
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beings in possession of such a variety of mental freedoms cannot engage
in intentional actions that are free. Surely, they are such that they not
only could choose the seitan (otherwise) when they actually chose the
tofu—a fairly mundane, facile ability, but they can have a mental state, a
sense of self, volitions, and emotions, among other things, that are entirely up to them, and that can be otherwise.

Conclusion

It strikes me as reasonable to think that if anyone is autonomous in Brent’s
sense, then surely so are Buddhist titans of mental autonomy.
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